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CASE NOTES
Labor Law—Federal Pre-emption—Constitutionality of State "Premium
Moratorium" Statute.—john Hancock Mut. Life ins. Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Ins. 1—The Massachusetts Legislature enacted a premium morato-
rium statute providing (1) that no life, disability, . or medical insurance policy
would lapse because of non-payment of premiums during a strike by the
insurer's collection agents if the premiums were "normally collected by
insurance agents employed by the insurer," and (2) that the policyholders
would be entitled to a premium grace period of thirty-one days after the
termination of the strike.' Under an enabling statute, 3 Hancock, an in-
surance company dealing in these types of policies, sought direct review of
the statute by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. HELD: The
statute is invalid since it conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act.4
The statute gives a potential economic weapon to the insurer's employees
which would restrict the bilateral freedom of collective bargaining intended
by Congress. Also, the statute directly interferes with a right specifically
protected under the NLRA, namely, the right of non-striking employees to
continue to work during the strike.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act" gave to the states wide power over the
business of insurance despite its interstate character. The same act, however,
specifically retained federal power over labor relations in the business through
application of the NLRA. 6
In the insurance field, as in others, the police power of the states and the
concurrent federal power under the •NLRA have created a "penumbral area
[which] can be rendered progressively clear only by the course of litigation." 7
In the landmark case of San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 8 the
Supreme Court discussed the broad field of labor relations and the extent to
which the NLRA had pre-empted the field, stating concisely that state power
must yield when an activity is arguably subject to section 7 0 or prohibited
by section 8 50 of the act. However, those areas of "merely peripheral concern"
1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh, 1007, 208 N.E.2d 516.
11 Mass. Acts 1963, ch. 796.
tt Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 175, §§ 22A, 108(2) (a), 132 (1959).
4 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964), amending 49 Stat.
449 (1935).
n 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964).
6 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1014 (1964).
Weber v-Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1955).
• 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964),
amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935), reads in part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid ur protection, and shall also have the right to
'drain from any or all of such activities ....
National Labor Relations Act § 8, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 158 (1964), amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935), defines unfair labor practices on the part of
an employer and on the part of a labor organization.
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to the NLRA or those activities "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsi-
bility" were still the proper subject of state power.
Although the Hancock court did not mention Garman, consideration of
NLRA pre-emption is necessarily guided by the Garmon rule. The pivotal
issue in applying the Garman standard to the facts in Hancock is whether
the operational effect of the premium moratorium statute is "arguably sub-
ject" to the NLRA or of "merely peripheral concern." By deciding that the
statute regulated an area pre-empted by the NLRA, the Hancock court
followed the trend toward severe limitation of state power where "free col-
lective bargaining' is in issue.
The area of "merely peripheral concern" with regard to free collective
bargaining has been eroded steadily during the past six years. In Local 24,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 12
 the Supreme Court denied the application
of an Ohio antitrust statute in a labor dispute. The statute prescribed the
terms and conditions which governed the minimal rental charge and other
leasing terms when a truck was leased to a carrier by an owner who drove his
own vehicle while in the service of the carrier. The Court found that the
statute regulated a substantive term of a labor-management agreement and
therefore conflicted with the federally created freedom of collective bargain-
ing.
In General Elec. Co. v. Callahan," a federal court of appeals held that
a Massachusetts statute" was contrary to the national policy of "free col-
lective bargaining." The statute in question required a state board to deter-
mine which party to a labor dispute was "blameworthy" and to publish a
report assigning the blame. Though the statute affected collective bargaining
only indirectly, the Callahan court held the statute invalid because the result-
ing public opinion would exert excessive pressure upon the parties to the
dispute .
The objection to the antitrust statute in Oliver was the attempted state
regulation of collective bargaining by injecting state power directly into the
substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The objectionable fea-
ture of the statute in Callahan was the indirect pressure on the process of col-
lective bargaining. Although this pressure was "indirect," it was not char-
acterized as being of "merely peripheral concern" to the NLRA. The holding
in Hancock goes beyond the Oliver and Callahan decisions. Unlike the anti-
trust statute in Oliver, the premium moratorium statute does not directly
inject state power into free collective bargaining. Unlike the "blaine-fixing"
report in Callahan, the premium moratorium statute does not have an un-
avoidable and immediate effect. The moratorium statute might affect free
collective bargaining, but such effect would be not only indirect but also
11 The term "free collective bargaining" does not appear in the NLRA. It is found
in the legislative history of the act. 93 Cong. Rec. 3835 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
The term as used in this note refers to the entire process of collective bargaining rather
than to the more narrow definition of collective bargaining found in 61 Stat. 140, 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
12 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
la 294 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 832 (1962).
14 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 150, § 3 (1965).
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speculative and potential. The effect of the Hancock statute would be
speculative because it assumed that the insurants, motivated by a thorough
knowledge of the moratorium, would not pay premiums during a strike and
would decide after the strike whether to make up the back payments or to
allow their policies to lapse. The effect would be potential because it required
a strike of some duration to build up the anticipated pressure.
One recent Supreme Court decision would not seem to require the present
decision.'' In DeVeau v. Braisted, 1° the constitutionality of the New York
Waterfront Act was in issue. The act prohibited the collection of dues from
waterfront employees by a union if any officer of the union had been convicted
of a felony. DeVeau challenged the act on the grounds that such prohibition
forced the union to select officers and bargaining representatives under con-
ditions which are not imposed by section 7 of the NLRA and that section
7 creates a federally protected freedom of collective bargaining. The Supreme
Court upheld the act, stating that the NLRA does not exclude every state
policy that may restrict complete freedom in collective bargaining.
Would Congress, with a lively regard for its own federal labor
policy, find in this state enactment a true, real frustration, however
dialectically plausible, of that policy?"
This question posed in DeVeau seems particularly applicable to the Hancock
decision. The speculative and potential effect upon which the court based
its finding that the premium moratorium statute gave the union a "potent
weapon which cannot fail unilaterally to restrict the desired bilateral freedom
of collective bargaining" is a dialectically plausible frustration of the NLRA.
But is it also sufficient to support a finding of "true, real frustration . . . of
that policy?"
To reinforce the pre-emption finding, the court considered the operational
effect of the moratorium statute upon other non-striking employees of the
insurer. By suspending the contractual right to insist upon prepayment of
premiums, the statute "curtailed or eliminated the premium collection work
available" for non-strikers. Since there would be little or no collection work
for non-striking agents, their right under the NLRA not to strike—and there-
fore to continue to work—would be impaired. Yet the cases cited by the court
to illustrate similar instances where this right to "keep working" has been
impaired deal with much more flagrant abuses of the right than the curtailing
of premium collection work foreseen under the moratorium statute. The cases
cited concern denial of access to the employer's plant" and reprisals levied by
15
 The strict rule followed in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner
of Ins., supra note 1, has not been followed by some lower courts; state power has
been asserted in libel cases arising out of a labor dispute. Brantley v. Devereaux, 237 F.
Supp. 156 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Meyer v. Local 107, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 416 Pa. 401,
206 A.2d 382 (1965). Contra, Linn v. Local 114, United Plant Guard Workers, 337
F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 381 U.S. 923 (1965); Blum v. International Ass'n
of Machinists, 42 N.J. 389, 201 A.2d 46 (1964). For a discussion of these four cases, see
Comment, 6 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev, 815, 816-20 (1965).
15 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
17 Id. at 153.
18 UAW-CIO v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
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the union against non-strikers. 1° The moratorium statute established no
similar direct prohibition on the right of the non-striking collection agents.
The Hancock decision must rest upon the operational effect of the
moratorium statute on "free collective bargaining." The anticipated effect is
a "dialectically plausible" frustration of the national labor policy. However,
in finding a repugnance to that policy based on a speculative and potential
effect on free collective bargaining, the Hancock court extends the reach of
federal pre-emption under the NLRA. The thrust of the decision is to eliminate
any area of "peripheral concern" from state regulation where free collective
bargaining may be affected.
PAUL F. BEATTY
Labor Law—Municipal Pensions—Vesting of Rights.--Yeazell v.
CoPins. 1—Appellant Kenneth Yeazell'became a member of the police depart-
ment of the city of Tucson, Arizona, in 1941. At that time, the Police Pension
Act of 1937 2 was in effect, which provided, inter alia, that a pension amount-
ing to fifty per cent of the average monthly earning for the single year im-
mediately preceding retirement be paid to any policeman who had been in
the service of the city for twenty years or more!' The act included a com-
pulsory pensioner contribution of two per cent of each paycheck to the
pension fund, out of which payments were to be made. 4 In 1952 the act was
amended;' increasing the employees' compulsory contribution to five per cent
and providing that the pension payment would be calculated on the average
month's pay for the five years immediately preceding retirement.°
Upon Yeazell's retirement and application for pension in 1962, the
appellee Police Pension Board fixed his monthly cash benefit payment in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the 1952 amended act. His awarded benefits
were $7.21 per month less than they would have been if computed by the
terms of the original act,of 1937. 7 •
Yeazell then brought a class action for a declaratory judgment that the
amendment was unconstitutional and void as applied to himself and others
1 B Allen-Bradley Co. v. NLRB, 286 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Bell
Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953).
1 402 P.2d 541 (Ariz. 1965).
Ariz. Code Ann, §§ 16-1801 to -1822 (1939).
;t
	 Code Ann. § 16-1808(b) (1939) provides:
Any member of the police department who has served such department twenty
(20) years in the aggregate may, upon application, be retired, and shall be paid,
(luring his lifetime, a monthly pension equal to one-half of the compensation
received by hirn . for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to the date of
application for retirement. . . .
4
 Ariz. Code Ann. § 16-1807 (1939). Thal section further provided that if a
contributor terminated his employment before the twenty years elapsed, he would be
entitled to a refund of his contributions with 3 1./.,% interest.
5 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann, §§ 9-911 to -934 (1952).
11
 Ariz, Rev. Slat. Ann. §§ 9-923, -925(A) (1932).
Supra note 1, at 542.
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